Abstract-Fully autonomous vehicles are emerging vehicular technologies that have gained significant attention in todays research endeavours. Even though it promises to optimize road safety, the proliferation of wireless and sensor technologies makes it susceptible to cyber threats thus dawdling its adoption. The identification of threats and design of apposite security solutions is therefore pertinent to expedite its adoption. In this paper, we analyse the security risks of the communication infrastructure for the fully autonomous vehicle using a subset of the TVRA methodology by ETSI. We described the model of communication infrastructure. This model clarifies the potential communication possibilities of the vehicle. Then we defined the security objectives and identified threats. Furthermore, we classified risks and propose countermeasures to facilitate the design of security solutions. We find that all identified high impact threats emanates from a particular source and required encryption mechanisms as countermeasures. Finally, we discovered that all threats due to an interaction with humans are of serious consequences.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles are vehicular technologies with the ability to make independent driving decisions. They are cooperative systems which aim at the optimization of the road transport systems and road safety [2] and are based on the following vehicular interactions; vehicle-to-vehicles (v2v), vehicle-to-infrastructure (v2i) and vehicle-to-other connecting technologies (v2x). Research into autonomous vehicle technology has received significant attention from academia and automotive industry and also received support from the government due to its potential benefits [1, 3] . NHTSA [4] defines 5 levels of autonomy to reflect the degree to which a driver is required to control and monitor road operations. Levels 0-2 require the driver to absolutely monitor the roadway situation. Level 3 requires the driver to maintain alertness to know when to take back control of the vehicle while in level 4, the driver cedes absolute control of critical driving functions and road monitoring. The generation of valuable data and exposure to external communications makes it susceptible to cyber threats with life threatening outcomes upon the successful execution of a malicious threat. Therefore, to expedite the adoption of this technology, it must be able to maximally guarantee the security of the driver and passenger. To achieve this, it is pertinent to identify the likely potential threats to the autonomous vehicle and then create apposite security solutions to mitigate threats. In this paper, we develop a model for the communication infrastructure to envisage likely threats to the autonomous vehicle and their origin. Then we identified the threats, conduct a risk analysis study to classify risks so as to understand the degree of seriousness of a particular threat and we proposed countermeasures for identify threats using the TVRA methodology by ETSI [5] . The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section II presents the communication infrastructure of the autonomous vehicle. In section III, we present our risk analysis study; we introduce the security environments, security objectives, identified threats, classify risks and propose countermeasures. Section IV concludes this paper.
II. MODEL OF COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE
We present a model of the communication infrastructure for autonomous vehicle in this section. The model encompasses all potential interactions between the vehicle and other connecting entities. P. Kleberger [6] described a communication infrastructure for a connected car. They divided their model into 2 distinct domains; the managed infrastructure and the vehicular communication. The managed infrastructure shows all networks the autonomous vehicle is likely to be connected to while the vehicle communication shows the communication links between the vehicle and other entities. Their model describes the likely connections of an autonomous vehicle therefore we adapt to their model and include only specific connections. Fig.1 . describes our communication infrastructure model. In our model, the managed infrastructure includes all networks the vehicle will be connected to and other ancillary services that can be provided for the autonomous vehicle. Vehicle communications shows all form of connections the vehicle will be exposed to using the DSRC wireless communication technology [7] . For example, connection to other vehicles (v2v), to roadside infrastructures (v2i) and other connecting technologies (v2x) like connecting the vehicle to the network of a diagnostic repair shop. 
III. RISK ANALYSIS
Having described the model of communication infrastructure for the autonomous vehicles, we analyse the threats and vulnerabilities due to automation of critical vehicle functions and in the communication exchanges between entities in the communication infrastructure model using the TVRA methodology developed by ETSI [5] . Most precisely, we focus on the basic interactions of the autonomous vehicle as it travels; the interactions between the vehicle and other vehicles, the interactions between the vehicle and the road side units and with the internet domain.
A. TVRA Methodology
TVRA uses the product estimation of the likelihood of attack and its impact to identify risk due to a particular threat. We employ a subset of the TVRA methodology in our risk analysis study for the autonomous vehicle. Fig.2 . specifies the steps we adopted in this study. Furthermore, we modified the TVRA process to include specific objectives for identified threats.
1) Target of Evaluation (ToE): the target of evaluation includes the description of our security environment which depends on the assets, threat agents and the assumptions made. We identify 3 potential targets of evaluation for the purpose of our risk analysis; the autonomous vehicle, the passenger in the vehicle, and the road side infrastructures (RSI).
• Assumptions: 1.) There exist a passenger in the vehicle; 2.) the passenger has at least one connecting device; 3.) communications within the target of evaluation boundaries are considered secured; and 4.) the internet is secured from any form of direct attack [5] .
• System assets: From the communication architecture, we categorise the system assets as: physical, logical and human. The physical assets include but not limited to the autonomous vehicle, human machine interface (HMI), road side units (RSU), on-board sensor monitor, and the in-vehicle passengers connecting devices. Logical assets include: communication protocols, sensor data, vehicle system controls and ancillary applications such as the applications from the automotive company [2, 5] . The human asset considered in this work is the invehicle passenger. While no known work includes this consideration, we argue that human assets could be exploited and used as a means to attack other valid communicating entities.
• Threat agents: we introduce a threat reference model to make obvious the source of threat and identify threat agents. The letters A, B and E in Fig.3 denote access interfaces. These interfaces are points by which an adversary can gain entry into the security environment and compromise a functional entity. The reference point A i means that in the vehicle, there exist a passenger(s) with connecting devices ranging from (i=1 to n) where n represents the total number of connecting devices the passenger has in the vehicle. The threat agents could be internal or external adversaries who seek an opportunity to compromise the communication infrastructure via a valid ToE. 2) Security Objectives We classify the security objectives as general and specific. General objectives are defined to specify what security measures needs to exist to assure security of the evaluated entities while the specific objectives are defined for specific threats identified so as to be able to obtain a counter measure that will mitigate threats to the autonomous and connecting system. Specific objectives will be listed in tandem with identified threats.
• General objectives: 1.) communication between vehicle and other communication entities in the security environment should be secured; and 2.) during major operating processes (booting and storage), the ToE platforms should be secured [2] . To achieve the objectives, we consider the following security services to allow for a secure communication [2, 5] ;
• Confidentiality: This requires only legitimate access to broadcasted messages.
• Integrity: This requires that message exchange among authorized entities cannot be altered. • Availability: This requires that at all time, authorized entities should never be denied access to requisite services.
• Privacy: This requires that the personal information of all human assets are protected from unauthorized access.
• Authentication: This requires that communicating entities can be confirmed as authentic.
• Authorization: This requires that only entities with necessary privileges have access to certain information.
• Plausibility: This ensures the veracity of data.
• Non-repudiation: This requires the implementation of an audit trail to keep track of executed transactions. 3) Threats We categorize the threats identified in this study as data, logical and human threats. Data threats are directed towards the identification of the asset and its location in a ToE environment. Logical threats are a compromise to the logical assets and directed towards the exploitation of a device, item or application. Human threats are threats carried out by authorized entities or directed to them. Table I summarizes the identified threats. 4) Risk analysis We obtain the risks for identified threats using an estimation value of likelihood that an attack will occur and the impact of the threats to the system. Risk = Likelihood * Impact
To obtain the likelihood of an attack, we give an attack potential based on time it will take to plan and launch the attack, the expertise of the attacker, knowledge, opportunity and the equipment needed to conduct the attack. The derived value is then mapped to the TVRA vulnerability rating to determine likelihood of occurrence [8, 9] . The impact reveals the likely consequences to the ToE. (3): threat has serious consequences. Medium (2): threat cannot be neglected; and Low (1): likely damage due to threat is low [3] . Risks are classified as minor (1,2,3 ) meaning the attack is unlikely, major (4) meaning the attack is likely but consequence is likely not fatal and critical (6, 9 ) meaning the risk is should be treated as urgent and appropriate countermeasures must be developed for them [2, 9] . Fig.  4 details the risk classification of the identified threats.
In Fig. 4 , all high impact threats have been classified as critical risks. These threats are also means by which other attacks could be mounted on the exposed ToE interfaces. For example, Illusion attack gives an attacker an advantage on the road. The attacker suppresses, alters messages and also communicates false sensor readings to deceive neighbouring vehicles. With sensor spoofing an attacker can cause a holistic dysfunction of the communication infrastructure. GPS time for example is used for time stamping and synchronizing messages. However with GPS spoofing, an attacker can impact on message timing by means of replay attack [2] . Sybil attack allows for the consumption of network bandwidth thereby leading to a denial of service attack. The serious impact of these attacks calls for the development of urgent and priority countermeasures to mitigate these threats. Reference points A, B represent a significant entry point for malicious users. High impact threats and major risks Fig. 4 . Risk Analysis also emanate from reference points A, B therefore, we conclude that the security of devices in the ToE exposed to reference points A, B would guarantee the overall security of the autonomous vehicle. Reference points A i and A represents a significant entry point for malicious users. Threats from these reference points are critical. This shows that a successful exploitation by a human asset has serious consequences on the communication infrastructure. Reference point A i represents the attack interface for the in-vehicle passenger who via spoofing and intrusion attacks compromise or could be used to compromise the communication infrastructure. 5) Countermeasure: The countermeasures to specific threats have been identified in Table III . The influence of human assets over the communication infrastructure must be critically considered and appropriate countermeasures built around intrusion detection, prevention and encryption mechanisms as well as strong security policies must be ensured to prevent and mitigate threats.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a communication model for autonomous vehicles and identified threats to the security of the full autonomous vehicle communication infrastructure. We conducted a risk analysis study using the TVRA methodology developed by ETSI and proposed countermeasures for identified threats. In analysing the risk to the communication infrastructure, we considered human assets as a means of exploitation and discovered that the impacts of the threat from humans are critical to the security of the communication infrastructure. The classification of risks for threats identified represents an upper-bound risk to the autonomous vehicle. The challenge now is expedite development of apposite security mechanisms to mitigate threats to facilitate the adoption of the autonomous vehicle technology.
